where (1) unproven treatments are being chosen not by the patient but by proxies and (2) the administration of treatment is (partly) to be funded by the NHS. It might be helpful to start off by considering a simpler case, stripped of these complications, and then to return to considering the more complicated kind.
The simpler case
Let us suppose that you are the patient with an inoperable cancer seeking your doctors' co-operation in the administration of an unproven therapy. You, we will suppose, are a competent adult without medical expertise, able and willing to pay in full for your own treatment. Your doctors have carefully and clearly explained to you their reservations about the therapy in question: having consulted with colleagues (oncologists and neurologists) they are convinced it will not cure and doubt that it will palliate. In addition to the obvious disadvantages attendent on operating on you they point out the risks relating to this procedure. All things considered they advise you against pursuing this therapy. But having heard them out you still want to go ahead. Indeed, if these doctors won't co-operate you'll seek out others who will.
In the circumstances what are your doctors' obligations -are they obliged to co-operate? Surely not. While you are within your rights taking risks with your own life and health, even foolish risks, others are not obliged to co-operate. If the risks you want to take are patently against your interests, then your doctors would be obliged to refuse to co-operate. They are, qua professionals, committed to using their skills only for their patients' benefit -that applies just as much to their private as to their NHS patients.
Suppose, though, that while the risks you would take in undergoing the unproven therapy are not patently against your interests, the considered view of your doctors is that the therapy is not worth a try, ie, is not in your interests yet, you disagree: are you entitled to insist, to demand, that they co-operate? It is uncontroversial that your doctors have a duty not to impose on you a treatment which you refuse but it is not so clear just what your doctors' responsibilities are in regard to treatments which you request of them. to be allowed at least the power of choice over what treatment to try -provided that choice is not crazy, would seem to be very much in their interests -even if in exercising this power they end up making choices which are not obviously reasonable, choices that their doctors think they would not make were their roles reversed. I suggest, then, that in the 'simpler case' we are considering here, the doctors may not be obliged to co-operate, but still their co-operating would seem on the face of it to be appropriate and their refusal to do so, inappropriate.
The complex case
We have already noted that patients are not entitled to dictate, only to request, an unproven therapy. The same obviously holds for proxies: they can request but not dictate. Of course paediatricians owe parents information and advice so as to enable them to exercise their right at least to request. If parents upon being informed then request treatment which is clearly against their child's interests, doctors must refuse to co-operate. The doctors' primary responsibility is always to the patient and the rights of proxies to decide for patients are never absolute.
Much more difficult, of course, is the Drs Yeoh et al kind of case, where it is far from clear what is in the patients' best interests. Drs Yeoh et al say: 'It was very difficult to assess objectively the possible benefit of the proposed treatment'.
Is this another case where we may find ourselves struggling to answer a question which it is not sensible to ask, viz whether from an objective standpoint the unproven treatment is worth trying? What is this objective standpoint supposed to be? What it is worthwhile to try, surely, has to be in relation to someone's goals, interests, purposes. Trying an unproven treatment may not be worthwhile from a researcher's standpoint -not likely, perhaps, to attract funding, given the track record of the research already done, yet worthwhile from a terminally ill parent's standpoint if nothing better is on offer. Thus doctors qua scientists may rightly be sceptical about the worthwhileness of an unproven therapy yet if, like the parents, they are simply concerned with what is in the child's best interests they might agree that anything is worth a try which conceivably might palliate or prolong life -at least provided the cost of trying to the child is relatively insignificant.
Yet should the doctors who advise the parents and are responsible for the child's treatment consider simply the child's interests -or are their responsibilities importantly different from the parents', seeing that the treatment would be funded (partly) by the NHS? Thus, consider the question: How much is it reasonable to spend on a treatment which might save your child's life but probably won't? Another silly question, is it not? It all depends -we want to know, reasonable for whom to spend -for you? For me? For the NHS? Quite probably, there will be three different answers here. Hence, similarly, we should not assume that what the parents acting as proxies consider reasonable expenditure will be considered so by hospital administrators.
Just whose side should the doctors be on where the expense of an unproven treatment is considerable? Luckily, we do not have to answer that question in regard to the Drs Yeoh et al case. I assume from the account given, in which the parents were shouldering much of the cost, the residual burden on the NHS would not have been thought excessive even by the hospital administration.
The particular case (Drs Yeoh et al) Did the doctors handle this particular case appropriately? I think so.
First of all notice that in this case it was not clearly against the child's interests to try the unproven therapy and yet neither was it clearly in the child's interests. Thus, the doctors were at pains to impress upon the parents their doubts about its efficacy and about the scientific credibility of the evidence for this therapy. This it was their duty to do, as the parents would not themselves be well positioned to appraise the reliability of the information they had received.
Yet when the parents indicated that they were determined to proceed in spite of the uncertainties and risks, the doctors deferred to their decision. 
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